The Phoenix of Counterinsurgency by Mockaitis, Thomas R.
The Journal of Conflict Studies
9





For the last three decades of the twentieth century, soldiers and aca-
demics confidently proclaimed the death of counterinsurgency
(COIN) as a major form of warfare. They asserted that the vast
majority of COIN campaigns occurred at the end of the colonial era
as nationalist insurgents ushered European powers out of Africa and
Asia. The passing of empires meant the end of this most vexing form
of warfare, so the reasoning went. The United States, in particular,
turned its back on unconventional conflict, embittered by the experi-
ence of Vietnam and committed to the defense of Western Europe and
South Korea. The end of the Cold War had little impact on this mind-
set, especially when the first Gulf War seemed to vindicate faith in
conventional arms. The complex humanitarian missions of the 1990s
bore a striking resemblance to COIN for those who wished to look
beneath the surface differences. The Somalia debacle, however, rein-
forced the conviction that irregular operations should be avoided,
not studied. Only the inescapable realities of Afghanistan and Iraq
have forced the rediscovery of effective COIN methods and then only
after much blood and treasure had been wasted. This article traces
the evolution of COIN and argues that it will remain a prevalent form
of warfare for the foreseeable future.
INTRODUCTION
When I began to study counterinsurgency (COIN) over 20 years ago, most
analysts had relegated it to “the dustbin of history.” They equated it with a series
of disastrous colonial wars that had unceremoniously ushered the European pow-
ers out of Africa and Asia. The few successful campaigns, such as the Malayan
Emergency, appeared to do little more than delay inevitable independence and
ensure that the successor state would be at least somewhat favorable to the for-
mer colonial master. In Northern Ireland, the British had achieved a desultory
stalemate with the Provisional Irish Republican Army, but even this conflict
seemed an echo of a dead imperial past that might eventually produce yet anoth-
er British withdrawal and a unified Ireland. Few saw in the campaign any lessons
worth capturing for future use.
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With the exception of the British, who had little choice, no Western mili-
tary establishment embraced COIN as a core task, least of all the Americans. The
bitter experience of Vietnam had disillusioned the US Army and Marine Corps
to such an extent that they practically expunged the term “counterinsurgency”
from their lexicon. The Southeast Asian war was seen as a diversion from their
proper task of defending Western Europe and the Korean peninsula.1 It had so
damaged morale and effectiveness that many officers in the mid-1970s referred
to a “broken army” that would have to be rebuilt as an all-volunteer force. Under
the circumstances, American officers could be forgiven for wanting to have noth-
ing more to do with COIN.
Reluctance to face them, however, could not make unconventional threats
disappear. The US military needed to retain at least some irregular warfare capa-
bility. The Nixon doctrine proclaimed that in the future the United States would
not take the lead in opposing insurgency, but it might help a threatened state to
do so. This approach relegated COIN to “Aid for Foreign Internal Defense,” one
task under the new heading “Low Intensity Conflict” (LIC). There it would
remain for the next two decades, although the category to which it belonged
would change first to “Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), and then
“Stability and Support Operations (SASO).” This shifting terminology and the
relegation of COIN to these catchall categories revealed a strong distaste for any-
thing but kinetic warfare in which armored divisions could kill people and break
things. 
Doctrine, of course, does not carry out missions. The US military still
needed someone to perform the odious tasks grouped under LIC, MOOTW, and
SASO. The task fell naturally to Special Forces: Green Berets, Navy Seals, and,
after the disastrous mission in the Iranian desert, Delta Force. The creation of
Special Operations Command by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act in 1986 reinforced the tendency to treat unconventional oper-
ations, especially COIN, as a specialist function. This approach worked well
enough for the remainder of the Cold War, but it had a serious, unforeseen con-
sequence. The vast majority of US soldiers received little or no training in COIN,
a task they believed they would never perform.
The chaotic decade that ignited the end of the Cold War offered several
conflicts that demonstrated the continued need for unconventional war doctrine
and training. The humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo
resembled counterinsurgency campaigns more than they did either traditional
peacekeeping operations or conventional war.2 However, the 1991 Gulf War
seemed to confirm and validate America’s faith in a purely kinetic approach to
armed conflict. The brief and disheartening Somalia mission reconfirmed the
wisdom of staying out of someone else’s war. When American troops deployed
to Bosnia in 1996 and Kosovo in 1999, they went in heavy, hunkered down in
fire support bases, like Camp Bondsteel, and sallied forth in armed humvees with
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GIs in full “battle rattle” (Kevlar flak jackets and helmets). The difficult task of
working closely with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local civil
institutions fell, once again, to specialists. Civil Affairs battalions drawn over-
whelmingly from the Reserve component relieved regular units of the need to
perform tasks that might have better equipped them to conduct operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Counterinsurgency has repeatedly proven itself the phoenix that will not
die, no matter how much regular armies wish for its demise. How best to edu-
cate, train, and equip security forces to conduct COIN campaigns, however,
remains a particularly vexing question. The study of successful campaigns to
derive broad lessons that may shape contemporary theory and practice offers one
useful approach to the problem.
Defining Terms
Imprecise definition often hinders clear understanding of insurgency,
which some analysts and many policy makers equate with terrorism. Insurgency
is an organized effort to gain control of a country from within through a combi-
nation of subversion, guerrilla warfare, and terror. Insurgencies grow out of bad
governance. Insurgents try to persuade disaffected groups that they can meet the
needs of ordinary people better than the current regime. Once the insurgents
erode support for the government, they use guerrilla warfare to undermine fur-
ther its credibility. As the military arm of the insurgency, they use hit-and-run
tactics against police, administrators, and small military units, melting back into
the sympathetic population after each operation. Guerrilla tactics wear down
government forces and/or provoke those forces into retaliating against the popu-
lation in which the guerrillas hide, thus encouraging more people to support the
insurgents.
Insurgents employ terror, but unlike contemporary terrorist organizations,
they do so very selectively. “Agitational terror” attacks on government buildings
and assassinations further weaken the regime, while “enforcement terror” keeps
reluctant supporters in line.3 Overuse of either costs the insurgents the popular
support they require to succeed. Limited use of terror and clear political objec-
tives distinguish classical insurgency from utopian terrorism, which aims at
broad ideological goals, has few other tactics except terror, does not distinguish
between military and civilian, and seeks mass casualties.
Beyond these common characteristics, insurgencies have taken many
forms. Mao Zedong developed a strategy for communist insurgency based on
gaining support in rural areas and isolating cities. He saw insurgent guerrillas
swimming in a sea of peasants that would eventually drown cities.4 His writings
provided the theoretical framework for many rural insurgencies, including the
Ho Chi Minh’s war of national liberation against the French in Indochina. Fidel
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Castro and Che Guevara used a variant of this approach, known as the foco the-
ory, to take over Cuba. 
Few insurgencies in the post-colonial world gathered enough momentum
to overthrow an established government. They might, however, provoke the
security forces into over-reacting to such an extent that the international com-
munity intervenes on behalf of the insurgents. The Kosovo Liberation Army used
this strategy with great effect against the Yugoslav Army. Ethnic cleansing drew
condemnation from the international community, which led to intervention by
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999. 
Often insurgencies improve the quality of life for the people, even if they
do not seize power. The Basque insurgent organization Fatherland and Liberty
(ETA in the Basque language) has yet to achieve an independent state and prob-
ably never will, but it has secured from the Spanish government considerable
autonomy, use of the Basque language, and respect for Basque culture. Although
the Fabrundo Martí National Liberation Front failed to overthrow the
Salvadoran government, it became a legitimate political party in a more open,
democratic process. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) did not drive
the British from Northern Ireland, but it brought attention to discrimination
against Catholics, which led to improvements in their quality of life and earned
Provisional Sinn Fein — the PIRA’s political arm — a share in political power.
Counterinsurgency includes all efforts taken to defeat insurgency.
Successful COIN requires a comprehensive strategy that attacks the root causes
of unrest while working to destroy the insurgent organization without harming
the general population. Most disaffected populations seek improvements in their
quality of life. Jobs, schools, clinics, and better infrastructure go a long way in
defusing popular anger at the government. Once these basic needs have been
met, political participation in a truly democratic process can undermine support
for the insurgents.
But development cannot occur in an environment of insecurity. Military
and police forces must protect threatened populations and attack insurgent guer-
rilla units. In doing so, however, they must keep the use of armed force focused
on the insurgents and proportional to the threat. Such control and restraint can
only be maintained when the security forces have good intelligence on the insur-
gents. Defeating insurgents, as British General Frank Kitson observed, consists
“very largely in finding them.”5 The best intelligence comes not from coerced
confessions but from voluntary cooperation by people persuaded that the gov-
ernment really cares about their well-being. As living conditions improve, even
insurgents may become disillusioned enough to surrender, especially if they are
offered amnesty and perhaps cash rewards for accurate information on their erst-
while comrades.
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Counterinsurgency becomes even more complicated for a foreign govern-
ment supporting a threatened state that it wishes to help but does not control. The
threatened regime may accept military aid to fight the insurgents but resist
demands for reforms that would erode their privileged positions.6 This problem
occurred in the case of El Salvador. US advisors encouraged the Salvadoran mil-
itary to respect human rights, but the Salvadoran government knew perfectly
well that the Reagan administration placed a higher priority on combating com-
munism than it did on promoting human rights or social justice in Latin America
and thus did little to improve their performance and image in this field.7
Anti-colonial Insurgencies and British Counterinsurgency
Numerous insurgencies occurred during the period 1945 to 1970 as part of
the process of decolonization. European states weakened by the Second World
War faced nationalist movements determined to gain independence. Virtually all
of these conflicts resulted in European withdrawal, although a few left pro-
Western regimes in place. The steady stream of insurgent victories led some
observers to assert that no conventional army could defeat an insurgency that
enjoyed popular support, the central theme of Robert Taber’s 1965 classic, War
of the Flea.8 This misreading of history prompted J. Bowyer Bell to respond with
The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Warfare and Malpractice, which clear-
ly demonstrates that insurgent victories came primarily against “soft” colonial
targets.9
Few conventional militaries have had as much experience of counterinsur-
gency as the British Army. For most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
the British engaged in a continuous series of border skirmishes, internal security
operations, and full-scale counterinsurgency campaigns. They conducted these
operations in a variety of settings throughout an empire covering a quarter of the
earth’s land surface and encompassing 25 percent of its populations. Out of this
diverse and extensive experience, the British fashioned a flexible approach based
on three broad principles: minimum force; civil-military cooperation; and decen-
tralization of command and control.10 Although far from a magic formula for
defeating insurgents, the British approach had yielded more success than that of
any other nation faced with internal conflict. 
Despite its impressive record, British counterinsurgency has received con-
siderably less attention than it deserves, particularly in the United States, where
British victories have been explained away or dismissed outright. Failure to
appreciate fully the value of the British approach stems from several factors.
First, the American experience in Vietnam created an understandable distaste for
counterinsurgency in general and British counterinsurgency in particular.
Abortive efforts to apply British methods developed during the Malayan
Emergency (1949-60) produced few results and could not recoup the deteriorat-
ing situation. As a result, US officers concluded that the two conflicts differed so
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much that little of value could be transferred from Malaya to Vietnam, save per-
haps in the area of jungle tactics.11 American receptiveness to British ideas was
not helped by Sir Robert Thompson, head of the British Observer Mission to
South Vietnam, who was openly and vociferously critical of the American
approach without fully appreciating significant differences between the two
campaigns.12 Thompson, who had helped design the winning strategy in Malaya,
rightly pointed out that both the South Vietnamese Army and its American allies
misapplied most of the British methods, and that, in any event, these methods
could not compensate for serious shortcomings in the American approach. Such
sentiments, freely and frequently expressed, did not endear Thompson to his
American “advisees.” In fairness to the Americans, Vietnam never was a purely
counterinsurgency campaign.
Not only was the post-Vietnam military disinclined to learn from the
British, they wanted little or nothing to do with counterinsurgency at all. Many
considered the war in Southeast Asia a wasteful episode fought under difficult
circumstances with insufficient political support and far too much interference
from on high. The conflict diverted valuable resources from the military’s prop-
er task of defending Western Europe and South Korea. The US Army, with its
preponderance of heavy divisions and commitment to maneuver warfare, seemed
ill suited to unconventional war, which was best left to Special Forces. The
Nixon doctrine shifted counterinsurgency to the umbrella category of “Low-
intensity Conflict” and relegated it to Special Forces, who would advise and
assist threatened friendly governments as part of “aid for foreign internal
defense.”13
More serious objections to the British approach came from scholars who
saw British victories as too closely tied to colonialism to be of much use in the
postcolonial world.14 They pointed out that in Malaya and elsewhere British
forces enjoyed an extraordinary degree of control over local populations and
could promulgate quite draconian emergency regulations with little accountabil-
ity to domestic opinion in the United Kingdom or international scrutiny. These
critics further noted that British “victories” were little more than holding actions
to delay the inevitable imperial withdrawal and perhaps handover to pro-British
successor governments. Finally, they could point to rather ignominious defeats in
Ireland (1919-21) and Palestine (1945-47).15
While such criticisms are not without merit, they overlook several impor-
tant points. British counterinsurgency did not end with the empire. One of its
most spectacular successes came in Oman (1970-75), and even the Troubles in
Northern Ireland seem to be ending on terms that do credit to the British Army’s
handling of the crisis. The army adapted its counterinsurgency experience to the
task of Wider Peacekeeping, as the new United Nations humanitarian interven-
tions of the 1990s came to be called.16 The British contingent in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Kosovo Force has performed better than most of
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its counterparts in the difficult tasks of security and rebuilding.17 Furthermore,
those who fail to see the continued efficacy of the British approach often mistake
specific tactics, which cannot be copied, for broad principles, which can. Finally,
the performance of British troops in the current Iraq insurgency demonstrates
learning from past campaigns and the continued efficacy of the British approach. 
A clear distinction must be made between methods and principles.
Copying specific tactics from one campaign and applying them slavishly to
another will almost certainly result in failure. The Americans learned this in
Vietnam where efforts to copy New Villages used in Malaya led to the disastrous
Strategic Hamlet program. Oddly enough, critics of the British approach contin-
ue to latch onto a single objectionable tactic from a single campaign to dismiss
the whole approach.18 Tactics, however, change with time and circumstances.
Some must be rejected as ineffective or unacceptable. The basic principles
remain the same.
Of all the nations threatened by insurgency during the second half of the
twentieth century, Britain alone has enjoyed any success in combating it. From
1948-60, British forces defeated a communist insurgency in Malaya, one of the
few such victories of the Cold War. During the same period, they suppressed
revolts in Kenya and Cyprus. From 1970-75, seconded British officers and spe-
cial forces units helped the Sultan of Oman defeat a communist insurgency
launched from neighboring Yemen. In the most challenging campaign of all,
British forces spent more than 30 years combating a tenacious insurgency in
Northern Ireland. A truce brokered in 1998 has, with a few exceptions, held up,
Sinn Fein has moved into legitimate politics, and the Irish Republican Army
recently announced its intent to disarm. 
The British have, however, experienced some significant failures. They
withdrew from the mandate of Palestine in May 1948 following an unsuccessful
campaign against Zionist insurgents seeking to establish the state of Israel. In
1967, they pulled out of Aden after a desultory war in that country. In each case,
though, the British determined fairly quickly that the insurgency could not be
defeated or was not worth the cost of trying to do so. No hearts and minds cam-
paign could have matched the powerful, emotive force of Zionism and the inter-
national sympathy it drew after the Holocaust. The struggle lasted just over two
years, cost the British 338 dead, and the insurgents even fewer.19 Withdrawal
from Aden resulted more from a reassessment of Britain’s role east of Suez
undertaken by the Labour government when it came to power in 1966.20 Again,
the British lost few people in a relatively brief campaign. Nothing like an Algeria
or Vietnam tarnishes the British record.
Further evidence of the continued value of the British approach to coun-
terinsurgency may be found in the peace enforcement operations of the 1990s.
Building upon methods developed during a century of imperial policing and
counterinsurgency, the British army adapted its methods to operations in Bosnia
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and particularly Kosovo. The effectiveness of this approach, presented in the
manual Wider Peacekeeping, may be seen in a comparison of the sector in
Kosovo with that of other coalition members. The British had foot patrols on the
ground in Pristina virtually from the time they arrived. They thus prevented retal-
iation against Serbs common in other brigade areas, including the American.21 A
similar failure to preserve law and order following the invasion of Iraq produced
consequences that plague the US military to this day.
The British Approach
British counterinsurgency developed out of a unique legal framework and
more than a century’s experience handling civil unrest. At the core of the British
approach lay the common law principle of “aid to the civil power.” English com-
mon law requires anyone to aid the civil authorities when called upon to do so
and makes no distinction between soldier and civilian. During a state of war
British forces do not operate in aid to the civil power and are subject to the
Mutiny Act (the equivalent of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) and inter-
national law, such as the Geneva Convention. Internal conflicts, however, occur
under conditions in which civil authority still operates. This legal framework
would have profound implications for the conduct of internal security operations
ranging from riots to full-scale rebellion.
To begin with, aid to the civil power put the civilian authority firmly in
control of handling unrest. A magistrate would typically request troops to quell a
disturbance and provide general guidance for their employment. He would not
exercise tactical control of the troops, but the military would be held accountable
for its action under ordinary civil law. Quelling temporary disturbances such as
riots proved to be relatively straight forward. Full-blown insurgencies presented
a more complex challenge requiring the civil authorities to work in close part-
nership with the military and police. This partnership resulted in a comprehen-
sive approach that was intended to address the causes of unrest while countering
its violent manifestations. 
Aid to the civil power also placed significant restrictions on the ability to
use force. Like police and those called upon to aid them, soldiers were bound by
the common law principle of minimum force. According to this principle, sol-
diers could use just enough force to achieve the immediate effect of stopping vio-
lent unrest in a particular location. Following the infamous massacre at Amritsar,
India in 1919, General Reginald Dyer faced disciplinary action not because he
opened fire on an illegal meeting, but because he continued firing after the crowd
had begun to disperse. As long as the offenders were British subjects, soldiers
had to exercise restraint when facing unrest ranging from riot to insurgency.
“There is, however, one principle that must be observed in all action taken by the
troops: no more force shall be applied than the situation demands.”22 A legal
principle could not, of course, prevent excesses from occurring, but it did have
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the desirable affect of subordinating use of military force to a broader political
strategy aimed at addressing the causes of unrest and winning the hearts and
minds of disaffected people.
Winning hearts and minds has become a much-maligned, often-misunder-
stood concept that conjures up images of soldiers building playgrounds for smil-
ing children, diverting personnel and resources from their proper task of fighting
wars. A hearts-and-minds campaign, however, consists of little more than sober-
ly assessing what motivates, then addressing, people to rebel. In most cases
unrest stems from bread-and-butter issues. Lack of jobs, decent housing, elec-
tricity, running water, health care, and education can motivate people to accept
or even actively support insurgents. Once their basic needs have been met, how-
ever, people may desire political freedoms, the absence of which can also fuel an
insurgency.
The realization that insurgency demands a political solution and the legal
limits placed on the amount of force the military could use led the British to
develop a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency. Soldiers and police
(collectively dubbed “security forces”) provided a shield behind which political,
social, and economic reform took place. Improving conditions encouraged ordi-
nary people to provide intelligence on insurgent activity. This intelligence in turn
allowed the security forces to take the offensive. Successful operations often
encouraged insurgents to surrender (provided they were granted amnesty and
perhaps a cash incentive) producing more intelligence leading to further success.
Combining the various elements of the British approach into a coherent
and effective counterinsurgency campaign required a mechanism of coordina-
tion. During the Malayan Emergency the British developed a committee system
at district, state, and federal levels. At the lowest level, these committees con-
sisted of the district commissioner (a civil administrator), the local chief of
police, and the commander of troops in the area (usually a lieutenant colonel
commanding a battalion). The High Commissioner and Director of Military
Operations, Sir Gerald Templer, insisted that committees meet at least once a
day, if only for “a whiskey and soda.”23 The system worked well in Malaya and
could be adapted to a variety of situations right up to and including Northern
Ireland and Iraq.
The British facilitated cooperation with the police and civil authorities
through extended military postings. Dubbed “framework deployment,” this
approach kept units in a specific locale for extended periods rather than moving
them around. Soldiers, like police officers on a beat, have to know an area inti-
mately. They met the locals, learned who belonged and who did not, and devel-
oped good relations with community leaders. This prolonged contact sometimes
yielded valuable intelligence on the insurgent organization and operations. At the
very least, soldiers learned to spot “the absence of the normal and the presence
of the abnormal.”24
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The British approach to counterinsurgency did not offer a panacea. The
British made serious mistakes even in successful campaigns and experienced sig-
nificant failures. Some insurgencies cannot be defeated even with the best of
approach, as the British learned in Palestine (1945-47) and South Arabia (1964-
67).25 Nonetheless, the British have a better track record in counterinsurgency
than any other nation. This success comes not from any special wisdom or
unique gifts possessed by British soldiers. It stems from an accident of history.
Britain’s insularity spared it the need to field a large conventional land force.
With the navy as the first line of national defense, the British army developed as
an imperial police force, whose primary task was to secure and maintain order
within an empire covering a quarter of the globe. Given so much experience with
internal security, British soldiers got relatively good at it. Even the inevitable dis-
engagement from empire during the second half of the twentieth century
occurred in relatively good order. The army then adapted what it learned in half
a century of colonial conflicts to the postcolonial tasks of peace operations in
Bosnia and Kosovo and to their operations in Northern Ireland and Iraq. 
Other National Experiences 
What I have called the British approach to counterinsurgency is not exclu-
sive to Britain. The military history of many nations, particularly those with
empires, offers relevant examples of successful counterinsurgency based on the
same broad principles of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, hearts and
minds, and decentralization of command and control. The conventional war
focus of most Western armies, however, prevented scattered historical COIN
experience from significantly impacting their institutional culture and doctrine.
Nonetheless, a brief overview of other national experience reveals that any con-
ventional army can adapt to unconventional threats and successfully combat
insurgency.
Like Britain, France acquired an extensive overseas empire. Unlike the
island nation, it always needed a large conventional army to defend its extensive
land borders. Of necessity that army focused on conventional conflict, which
comprised the bulk of its military experience. Nonetheless, the French military
enjoyed considerable success in its campaign to pacify Morocco during the inter-
war period. Field Marshall Lyautey developed an “oil spot” strategy, clearing
insurgent areas and holding them with garrisons who then swept the surrounding
countryside, spreading like pools of oil over troubled waters. Unfortunately, this
success did not produce an effective COIN doctrine that survived into the turbu-
lent post-war era.
France fought two disastrous counterinsurgency campaigns in the post-
1945 period. In Indochina it faced a protracted conflict following its reassertion
of colonial control in 1945. The communist Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh con-
ducted a classic Maoist “people’s war” beginning with insurgency and leading up
to a conventional victory over the French at Dien Ben Phu. While France could
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probably not have maintained colonial control much longer, it might have hand-
ed power to a more stable, pro-Western regime. Unfortunately, the French made
every conceivable mistake a threatened regime can make. It fielded a heavy,
road-bound army, over-relied on firepower, and relinquished control of the coun-
tryside to the Viet Minh. Most significantly, France had nothing to offer the
Vietnamese people to address the demand for independence. 
Far from teaching the French the value of a different approach, the experi-
ence of Indochina had little positive effect on France’s next colonial conflict, the
Algerian civil war. Although French forces enjoyed some success in routing out
rural insurgents, they faced a more formidable challenge in the capital city of
Algiers. Determined not to fail again, the army launched a brutal but ultimately
successful campaign in the city. Making liberal use of torture, they assembled a
detailed intelligence picture of the insurgent organization dubbed an
organogram. This information allowed them to neutralize the National
Liberation Front in Algiers.26 However, the political fallout from the “Battle of
Algiers” destroyed any tactical gains it achieved. Support for the insurgency
grew in Algeria as support for fighting it waned in France. The French granted
the former colony independence in 1962. Algiers provides the clearest example
of how easy it is in counterinsurgency to win the battles but lose the war.
The US military also had substantial counterinsurgency experience in the
first half of the twentieth century. It fought and defeated nationalist insurgents
following conquest of the Philippines during the Spanish American War of 1898
and conducted successful interventions against guerrillas in Latin America dur-
ing the interwar period. These operations required a skillful combination of
small-unit, counter-guerrilla operations and civic development to win the hearts
and minds of local people. Unfortunately, the experience of Second World War
washed away the memory of these conflicts so thoroughly that the American mil-
itary entered Vietnam having forgotten most of the counterinsurgency lessons it
had learned in the preceding 50 years.
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the World of the Twenty-First Century 
9/11 changed the world of military thought as it altered so much else. The
need to invade and occupy Afghanistan to root out the Taliban and al-Qaeda
revived a need to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations. The invasion
of Iraq also underscored this need. In both wars, soldiers have relearned these
lessons at great cost in blood and treasure, but the learning curve has been steep.
American forces and their coalition partners have adapted to the difficult cir-
cumstances of unconventional war. Nowhere has this learning been more clear-
ly demonstrated than in the US Army’s new COIN manual, FM 3-24:
Counterinsurgency. This publication incorporates the broad principles of British
counterinsurgency: winning hearts and minds, using force in a selective manner
based on good intelligence freely given, and civil-military cooperation. Whether
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or not the new approach will succeed in Iraq or be a sad case of “too little, too
late” remains to be seen. One thing at least seems certain, insurgencies and insur-
gent-style conflicts will occur for the foreseeable future and armed forces must
prepare to deal with them. The phoenix may become dormant for a time but it is
certain to be reborn yet again.
Thomas R. Mockaitis is Professor of History at DePaul University.
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